Self-managed Inter-domain pricing: An overview and discussion of possible approaches by Tran, Hoang-Hai & Tuffin, Bruno
Self-managed Inter-domain pricing: An overview and
discussion of possible approaches
Hoang-Hai Tran, Bruno Tuffin
To cite this version:
Hoang-Hai Tran, Bruno Tuffin. Self-managed Inter-domain pricing: An overview and discussion
of possible approaches. [Research Report] RR-6992, INRIA. 2009. <inria-00403953v5>
HAL Id: inria-00403953
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00403953v5
Submitted on 27 Nov 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
appor t  

de  r ech er ch e 
IS
SN
02
49
-
63
99
IS
R
N
IN
R
IA
/R
R
-
-
69
92
-
-
FR
+
EN
G
Thème COM
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE RECHERCHE EN INFORMATIQUE ET EN AUTOMATIQUE
Self-managed Inter-domain pricing: An overview
and discussion of possible approaches
Hoang-Hai Tran — Bruno Tuffin
N° 6992
July 2009
Centre de recherche INRIA Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique
IRISA, Campus universitaire de Beaulieu, 35042 Rennes Cedex
Téléphone : +33 2 99 84 71 00 — Télécopie : +33 2 99 84 71 71
Self-managed Inter-domain pricing: An overview
and discussion of possible approaches
Hoang-Hai Tran∗, Bruno Tuffin†
The`me COM — Syste`mes communicants
E´quipe-Projet DIONYSOS
Rapport de recherche n° 6992 — July 2009 — 33 pages
Abstract: Telecommunication networks are now an interconnection of compet-
itive operators that need to cooperate to ensure end-to-end delivery of traffic.
Inter-domain agreements have to be performed, and pricing is seen as a relevant
way to reward intermediate domains for forwarding the traffic of others and
such that the network can be efficiently self-managed, in a way as decentralized
as possible. In the devoted literature, Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) auctions
have been highly considered because they provide proper incentives, lead to an
efficient use of the network and verify other relevant characteristics. On the
other hand, it has been highlighted in this specific context that they are neither
budget-balanced nor robust to collusion. After reviewing the list of properties
that we ideally would like the Inter- domain pricing to verify and the fact that
no mechanism can ensure them all together, we discuss the properties that could
be relaxed. Furthermore, we present related works on pricing and resource al-
location not especially devoted to inter-domain pricing, and discuss how they
can be applied to our specific problem and what are the corresponding results.
Key-words: Internet pricing, game theory, auctions, network management,
resource allocation
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Tarification inter-domaine auto-ge´re´e : une vue
d’ensemble et discussion des approches possibles
Re´sume´ : Les re´seaux de te´le´communication sont maintenant une interconnection
d’ope´rateurs compe´titifs ayant besoin de coope´rer pour assurer la livraison point-
a` point de leur trafic. Des accords inter-domaines doivent eˆtre re´alise´s, et la
tarification semble eˆtre une me´thode pertinente de re´compenser les domaines
interme´diaires transfe´rant le trafic des autres et telle que le re´seau soit efficacement
auto-ge´re´, de manie`re aussi de´centralise´e que possible. Dans la litte´rature, les
enche`res Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) ont fait l’objet d’une attention particulie`re
car elles fournissent les bonnes incitations, conduisent a` une utilisation efficace
du re´seau, et ve´rifient e´galement d’autres proprie´te´s inte´ressantes. Cependant il
a e´te´ e´tabli pour ce contexte spe´cifique qu’elles ne sont ni e´quilibre´es sur la plan
budge´taire, ni re´sistantes a` la collusion entre ope´rateurs. Apre`s avoir passe´ en
revue la liste des proprie´te´s qu’ide´alement nous souhaiterions voir ve´rifie´es par
la tarification inter-domaine, nous e´tablissons qu’elles ne peuvent eˆtre obtenues
toutes en meˆme temps. Nous discutons alors les proprie´te´s qui peuvent eˆtre
relache´es. Nous pre´sentons e´galement des travaux proches sur la tarification
et l’allocation de ressource non spe´cifiquement consacre´s a` la tarification inter-
domaine, et discutons leur application a` ce proble`me.
Mots-cle´s : Tarification, the´orie des jeux, enche`res, gestion des re´seaux,
allocation de ressources
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1 Introduction
The Internet has evolved from an academic (and cooperative) network into a
highly competitive inter-connected one with many service providers trying to
optimize their own profit, even if at the expense of the others. The question
is therefore to better understand the (economic) relations between the different
domains, also called Autonomous Systems (ASs) and their implications from an
engineering point of view. The Internet consists of thousands interconnected-
AS defined as different Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Up to now, routing
between different ASs are managed by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) or
Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP), and Interior Gateway Protocols (IGPs) han-
dle traffic within a single AS. Inter-domain has indeed been studied for many
years, from an engineering or “protocol design” point of view, but the competi-
tion and selfishness issues have more recently shifted it to a more economic or
“mechanism design” oriented point of view[6, 17]. The basic tool is game theory,
a branch of applied mathematics whose motivation is to mathematically inves-
tigate agent’s behavior in strategic situations. Game theory has been applied
to networking and telecommunication to solve routing and allocation problems
in a competitive environment [1]. It can also be used to see if rewarding in-
termediate domains for forwarding the traffic of others can help to efficiently
self-manage inter-domain relationships, in a way as decentralized as possible [9].
Our work is therefore motivated by studying Inter-domain routing and resource
(mainly bandwidth) allocation from an economic point of view. The issues that
are raised and which require to be solved are summarized as follows:
 The ASes need to exchange traffic on behalf of their customers, and trans-
parently to them, in order to provide end-to-end service. This requires
other providers to agree to forward that traffic. However, the providers
are strategic (or selfish) agents and they usually behave according to their
best interest. Why would they use their own resources for competitors
without a proper economic incentives? Similarly, an AS may discriminate
the traffic that originate from its own customers and against the traffic
from customers of its competitors. The existing routing protocols have
not dealt with those situations in which the providers do not follow the
cooperative rules.
 Defining economic incentives to participate and forward traffic helps to
create a “working” network, but we also expect it to be efficient in the
sense that the resulting allocation of resources is optimal with respect to
the sum of agents’ true preferences, also called social welfare.
 Another major issue with a general network topology is that determining
the optimal resource allocation, calculating the cheapest paths, comput-
ing the price paid for each provider, and the maximization of social wel-
fare, are computationally demanding and may even be generally NP-hard
problems. A goal would be to provide a mechanism which is self-managed,
decentralized, and each non-cooperative AS’s own interest is to behave in
the general interest.
This paper aims at reviewing the problem of inter-domain pricing. In the
literature, the main family of work is based on Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
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auctions, which have the properties to be incentive compatible and efficient,
meaning that each agent reveals his real valuation for bandwidth, and an op-
timal resource (bandwidth) allocation is derived, in a decentralized way. This
has been successfully applied to inter-domain pricing in the seminal work [19]
using an adaptation of BGP. On the other hand, some important issues have
been forgotten. First of all the pricing scheme is not budget-balance, meaning
that the sum of revenues is larger than the sum of charges. As a consequence, a
central authority (a government?) has to permanently inject money in the sys-
tem to make it work. This is very unlikely. Actually, it can be proved that it is
impossible to design a mechanism verifying at the same time incentive compati-
bility, efficiency, individual rationality (no agent will get a negative utility, that
is each agent has interest in participating into the game) and budget balance.
For this reason, we list as exhaustively as possible the various properties that
an inter-domain mechanism should verify in order to see which set would be the
most relevant (as it is impossible to have them all together). We then review all
the related works on pricing for multiple objects that can be related to inter-
domain pricing, and organize them in families verifying given set of properties.
We additionally apply those schemes specifically to our Inter-domain model with
its specificities, to investigate their behavior and how the results can then be
adapted. From those results, we are able to discuss the most relevant pricing
scheme for inter-domain.
2 Mechanism design and desirable properties
In this section, we make a short introduction of mechanism design and review
the properties that are the most relevant to Inter-domain pricing.
2.1 Mechanism design
Mechanism design theory provides us a tool for studying and designing a dis-
tributed algorithm for Inter-domain pricing. The mechanism is designed in a
way that all agents participated in a game should be forced or at least incentive
to act according to the rules of the designer. For more detail and understanding
of mechanism design, we recommend to the readers [45][57] and the references
therein.
First, let us bring some basic notations from mechanism design theory that
will be helpful to understand the main results. Assume there is n agents in
set N = {1, . . . , n} and each agent has a choice within a set of action Ai. Let
xi ∈ Ai be the action of agent i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and define (x1, ..., xn) as the
strategy profile. To this set of actions, the designer maps an outcome vector
θ = (θ1, ..., θn), where θi represents the outcome (or allocation) of agent i.
Similarly, with each outcome is associated a payment vector ρ = (ρ1, ..., ρn),
with ρi the payment of agent i. ρi < 0 means that agent i is rewarded for
his action, while ρi > 0 means that he has to pay for it. Each agent i has his
own preferences over outcomes, reflected by his valuation function Vi. Valuation
function vi assign a non-negative, real number Vi(θi) over each possible outcome
θi. Each agent is assumed to act selfishly and strives to maximize his own profit
or utility and Ui is the utility function of player i. The utility is assumed to be
quasi-linear between valuation Vi for the outcome θi, and the payment ρi(θi),
INRIA
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i.e.,
Ui(θi) = Vi(θi)− ρi(θi).
Since the outcome depends on the whole action profile, the underlined frame-
work is that of non-cooperative game theory, and the equilibrium notion that of
Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (x∗1, ..., x
∗
n), to which
is associated an outcome θ∗ = (θ∗1 , . . . , θ
∗
n) and a payment ρ
∗ = (ρ∗1, . . . , ρ
∗
n) such
that no agent can increase his utility by unilaterally changing his action. For-
mally, we have a Nash equilibrium if ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, if x = ((x∗1, ..., x
∗
i−1, xi, x
∗
i+1, . . . , x
∗
n)
with corresponding outcome θ (and payment ρ), we have Ui(θ
∗) ≥ Ui(θ). A no-
tion related to Nash equilibrium is the concept of dominant strategy. A strategy
xi is called to be a dominant strategy if the strategy earns agent i a larger
payoff than any other, whatever the strategies of others. It is obvious that a
strategy profile (x1, ..., xn) in which every xi is dominant for player i is a Nash
equilibrium.
It may happen that no pure Nash equilibrium exists, and the concept of
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies comes in, where instead of choosing a
strategy, each agent plays with a probability distribution over the the set of
strategies, from which the eventual one is randomly chosen. A Nash equilibrium
in mixed strategies is a profile of probability distributions over which no agent
can unilaterally increase his expected utility (where the expectation over the
whole profile of distributions [47].
Bayesian games are games for which information about characteristics of the
other players (their utilities) is incomplete, a common and relevant assumption
in inter-domain. Formally, a Bayesian game with n players is defined by
 A set N = {1, . . . , n} of n agents/players;
 A set Ω of states describing all the players’ relevant characteristics;
 A space of strategies A = A1× ...×An where xi ∈ Ai is the set of actions
available to agent i ∈ N .
 A finite set Ti of signals, or types, that player i can observe due to the
incomplete information, and a signal function τi : Ω → Ti mapping each
state to a signal.
 A probability measure pi of prior beliefs for each agent i, defined over Ω
and such that pi(τ
−1
i (ti)) > 0 for all ti ∈ Ti.
 Utility functions defined as in the above normal form of the game.
Each strategy profile x = {x1, ..., xn} leads to an outcome θ = {θ1, ..., θn}
and a payment vector ρ = {ρ1, ..., ρn}. The payment ρi is given to agent i to
incentive him to behave according to the rules for the overall goals. A strategy-
proof mechanism is one in which truthful report of an agent is always dominant
strategy. A stronger form of mechanism called strategy-proofness in which no
coalition of agents has incentive to misreport its willingness to pay (its true
valuation).
Each player knows his type, but needs to hold beliefs about actions of other
players, but this belief may depend the player i’s own actions. A Nash equilib-
rium in a Bayesian is a Nash equilibrium where each expected utilities are used,
with posterior belief distributions pi(ω)/pi((τ
−1
i (ti)) for each player i.
RR n° 6992
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Those general notions of game and equilibrium will be useful later on to
analyze the inter-actions of ASes and design a proper mechanism. Indeed, the
goal of mechanism design is to build a mechanism (that is an allocation/outcome
mapping from the strategy profile, and a payment rule) with some desired prop-
erties among the ones listed below.
2.2 Properties
What is the list of properties that can be of interest for a mechanism designer
(and in particular in the case of inter-domain pricing)? We now review them in
detail.
1. Individual Rationality: a mechanism is said to be individually rational if
and only if rational playing by agents does not lead to any agents being
worse-off after the game. More specifically, the mechanism is individually
rational if and only if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and all θ, Ui(θ) ≥ 0.
2. Truthfulness, also called Incentive Compatibility: Truthfulness is hold
when agents truthfully disclose their preferences to the mechanism in equi-
librium. A mechanism is said to be truthful if every agent i’s best interest
is to play or submit a strategy that corresponds to the true valuation agent
i has for the service. A precise and more formal definition is difficult in a
general context but will be made clear for several mechanisms. As a short
illustration, in auctions, the principle would be to bid the real valuation
of the player for the quantity asked, the real cost when buying or sell
something.
3. Budget balance: Besides allocating the goods, the mechanism collects and
in some cases distributes the money from buying agents and to selling
agents. Thus, the mechanism is said to be budget-balanced if the mech-
anism guarantees not to lose money. Formally, the mechanism is budget-
balanced if and only if ∑
1≤i≤n
ρi(θ) = 0.
The mechanism will be said to be weakly budget-balanced if the sum of
money exchanges is non-negative, i.e., if
∑
1≤i≤n
ρi(θ) ≥ 0. As we will see
later in the paper, some mechanisms appealing a priori actually verify∑
1≤i≤n
ρi(θ) < 0, meaning that they require an authority injecting money
permanently.
4. Allocative Efficiency: A mechanism is called efficient the mechanism max-
imizes the total utility gain or social welfare of all agents involved in the
game when they implement at the final Nash equilibrium. In other words,
the mechanism enforces the agents to play strategies such that an outcome
is the same as the maximization in the cooperative case. Formally, the
mechanism is efficient if it leads to an outcome θ∗ such that
θ∗ = argmax
θ
∑
i∈N
Vi(θi).
INRIA
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When the mechanism is budget-balanced, the maximization of social wel-
fare is equivalent to max
∑
1≤i≤n
Ui(xi).
5. Decentralization: This property is related to scalability issue, so that
the mechanism is robust in terms of computational time to an increas-
ing number of agents. Decentralization basically means that decisions can
be spread all over agents and there is no need to concentrate them at a
central authority. Decisions can therefore be made locally with a limited
information.
6. Robustness to collusion: due to the game-theoretic framework, it may
happen that agents have can increase their utility if they collude with
other agents in a group. Each agent in the group could then gain from this
situation, at the expense of global social welfare. Designing a mechanism
for which collusion is never profitable is a desirable property.
2.3 Feasibility issue
While designing a mechanism verifying these properties all together would be
expected, it has been shown that verifying a subgroup of them, namely individ-
ual rationality (IR), incentive-compatibility (IC), efficiency and budget-balance
(BB), is already not possible [42, 57].
Theorem 1. [28, 29, 22] No dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanism
is always both efficient and weakly budget balanced, even if agents are restricted
to the simple exchange setting.
Theorem 2. [44, 43] No Bayes-Nash incentive-compatible mechanism is al-
ways simultaneously efficient, weakly budget balanced, and interim individually
rational, even if agents are restricted to quasi-linear utility functions. 1
Following the two theorems, it turns out that it is impossible to design
a mechanism that simultaneously achieves incentive-compatibility, efficiency,
budget-balance and individually rationality. The challenges are now for us
1. To model our inter-domain pricing problem,
2. to investigate the properties verified or not by the existing propositions,
3. to discuss the most relevant properties and those which can be relaxed.
An important remark from the literature is that this impossibility to verify
all properties has driven to an almost-the property framework where the idea is
to relax one of the properties, but to be ”close” to it. This is for instance the
case for incentive-compatibility in [30, 31], and for budget balance in [40, 41].
1 At the interim stage, each agent can decide whether or not to participate in the mechanism
and the decision has to be made without knowing other private information. The agent will
decide to participate in the game if his expected net-payoff is non-negative. However, It is
possible in interim stage that his net pay-off can be negative. On the other hand, ex-post IR
allow agents to learn the term of the game before deciding whether to participate in the game
or not, and his net pay-off is always positive. Hence, no agent will ever regret the choice he
made, and it is obvious that ex-post IR is stronger condition than Interim IR.
RR n° 6992
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3 Inter-domain problem and modeling
We now specifically define our inter-domain pricing problem, in order investi-
gate the properties verified by the mechanisms from the literature, and of other
propositions not already applied to that problem, but closely related. We begin
with the description of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the standard protocol
currently used for Inter-domain. Afterward, the Inter-domain resource alloca-
tion problem and mathematical modeling are presented.
3.1 Inter-domain routing: the Border Gateway Protocol
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is currently the core routing protocol of
the Internet [20]. It maintains a table of IP networks which designates network
reachable among ASes. It is a path vector protocol and makes routing decisions
based on path, next hop policies. The basic idea of BGP is to build a routing
tree from a source node to a given destination hop-by-hop. Communication
between nodes is made through update messages [52]. The update messages
give nodes a way to construct a consistent view of the network topology. The
process is initialized when a destination node d announces itself to its neighbors
by sending update messages. For each source node i, the route to d is iteratively
established as follows:
 Importing routes to d from its neighbor nodes via update messages.
 Choosing the best route to d through one of its neighbor based on routing
metric. BGP only uses single routing metric to determine the best path
to a given destination node. This metric is assigned to each link by the
network administrator which may be based on delay, cost or speed.
 If there is any change in the route to d, i updates its routing table via new
update messages.
Each node therefore maintains its routing table which contains all feasible, short-
est paths to a particular AS, transmits or receives update messages and makes
routing decisions. In BGP, nodes do not regularly update their routing table,
only in case there is an update for an optimal path to a network.
3.2 Inter-domain resource allocation problem modeling
The network is modeled as a graph G = (V, L), where nodes in V are the ASes
and links in L are the existing direct links between ASes. We assume for now
that there is no capacity constraints. There is a set R of routes. Each route
r ∈ R is defined as an ordered list of nodes, each node appearing only once, and
such that for two successive nodes in the list there exists a link ` ∈ L between
those two nodes. Define also for node v ∈ V , RS(v) the subset of routes starting
at v and RD(v) the subset of routes ending at v.
Define yr the flow for route r and y the vector of all flows y = (yr)r∈R. The
total rate initiated in node v is
xIv =
∑
r∈RS(v)
yr,
INRIA
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and the flow transferred through v is
xTv =
∑
r∈R\(RS(v)∪RD(v))
yr.
From those allocated rates, the utility of an AS v is given by
Uv(y) = Vv(x
I
v)−
∑
r∈RS(v)
CIr (v) +
∑
r∈R\(RS(v)∪RD(v))
CTr (v) (1)
where
 Vv(x
I
v) is the valuation of AS v for sending traffic x
I
v, which deals with
the relation its customers. It is defined here as the valuation of the total
rate because we assume that the traffic value is the same on all routes.
If differentiation needs to be done, this component can be replaced by∑
r∈RS(v) Vv,r(yr) to provide different valuation function for the different
routes.
 CIr (v) is the total charge imposed to v for sending traffic on route r and
initiated from v. The charge can be linear in the traffic CIr (v) = c
I
r(v)yr,
but not necessarily. Similarly, depending on the mechanism applied, the
charge can be the total charge from all the intermediate nodes, or the
charge from neighbors only, which are themselves charged from the next
hops and then passes it on the sender (what will be typically done when
using BGP).
 CTr (v) is the total reward for traffic forwarded by v on route r. Here again,
it can be linear in yr, i.e., C
T
r (v) = c
T
r (v)yr, and can be directly charged
to the initiator, or, for decentralized purposes, it can be the difference
between the charge to the predecessor on the route and the charge from
the successor (that v is paying).
Note that two different routes can have the same source and destination.
Therefore, the model is general here in the sense that (i) multi-homing among
several routes is possible (ii) or routing is fixed because only one route is pro-
posed inR between each possible pair of ASes (iii) or several routes are proposed
but at the end of the allocation process, only one potentially gets a strictly pos-
itive flow. Constraints can be imposed without loss of difficulty to let those
choices possible.
An important remark is that utilities depend here on allocations yr on all
routes r and charges, i.e., on allocation and charging rules. This is therefore
dependent of the outcome of the game where each AS strives to maximize its
utility function. Similarly, we do not explicitly describe how ASes play, i.e.,
what is their action space, because it is mechanism-dependent and will be de-
scribed in next sections. Basically though, they can play on the charge for
transferring traffic of competitors and/or the quantity they want to send on
each route (initiated from them or not) and the price they would accept to pay
for it. Several situations can indeed be envisaged, and they will be explicitly
defined when describing the different variants/mechanisms in the remainder of
the paper.
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4 The popular mechanism: Vickrey Clarke Groves
(VCG) auction
4.1 VCG auction and Inter-domain
Vickrey original auction mechanism for a single item and multiple identical
items provides an efficient allocation mechanism in which the dominant strategy
of all participants is to bid truthfully. Vickrey auction for a single item is
often refereed to the second-price sealed-bid auction in which the highest bidder
wins the item and pays the second highest bid. Vickrey original auction has
been merged with the Clarke-Groves design for heterogeneous goods and does
not require the bidders have non-increasing marginal values. In the resulting
mechanism, called Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves or VCG mechanism [8, 23, 3], the
auctioneer allocates the goods to the highest bids. However, rather than paying
the price he bids for his units, a winning bidder pays the opportunity cost for the
units won [61]. In other words, what you pay is the sum of declared valuations
when you are in the game minus the sum of declared valuations for the outcome
when you are excluded from the game.
Theorem 3. [3] Truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for each bidder in the
VCG mechanism. Moreover, when each bidder reports truthfully, the outcome
of the mechanism maximizes social welfare. It is the only mechanism [42] which
verifies in general incentive compatibility, individual rationality and efficiency
at the same time.
This theorem makes VCG particularly attractive for resource allocation
problems with distributed computing. To illustrate this, truthful routing in
algorithmic mechanism design has been first investigated from the seminal pa-
per of Nisan and Ronen [46]. They provide a polynomial-time, strategy-proof
mechanism for cheapest route selection in a centralized model. They formulate
the communication network by a directed graph G, and focus on a route be-
tween a source and a destination. Each edge e of the graph is a strategic agent
and the algorithm ensures that when agents honestly report their cost ce (by
applying VCG), the cheapest path is selected. The payment given to each edge
e on the cheapest path is pe(yr) =
∑
w cw1(w∈(y∗−e)) −
∑
w 6=e cw1(w∈(y∗)) and 0
if not on this path.
∑
w cw1(w∈(y∗−e)) is the cost of the cheapest path which does
not contain e and
∑
w 6=e cw1(w∈(y∗)) is the cost of the cheapest path including
e, but not counting its cost. The given mechanism is a pure VCG mechanism.
This preliminary suggestion is improved on the two papers of J. Feigenbaum et
al. toward incentive-compatible Inter-domain routing [18, 19] described now.
Let us know explicitly define VCG auctions in this inter-domain context.
We start by illustrating the problem with the seminal work of Feigenbaum in
this area. In this work, the amounts of traffic xIv initiated from each node v are
fixed. Each node is then seen as an intermediate node and his action is to define
the per unit of volume cost cTv that he declares for transferring traffic. The goal
of the mechanism designer is to minimize the real total cost of routing
∑
v
c¯Tv x
T
v , (2)
INRIA
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where c¯Tv designs the real cost (not necessarily the same than the declared
one). This fits our general model by saying that the valuation V Iv (x
I
v) of node
v is −cTv yr1(v∈r and yr>0) (that is, represents his costs) and then
∑
v V
I
v (x
I
v) =
−
∑
v c¯
T
v x
T
v minimizing routing of cost is the same as maximizing the social
welfare, i.e., the sum of valuations of all actors in the game. All nodes are
assumed here to be intermediate nodes, which means that CIr (v) = 0 ∀r, v. The
transfer payments CTr (v) = p
T
v yr (with unit price p
T
v ) are defined below. The
allocation rule of the mechanism allocates flows to the route that maximize the
declared total cost of routing
y∗ = argmaxy
∑
v
c¯Tv x
T
v .
To represent formally the payment rule, define y∗−v as the allocation if AS v is
not part of the game (that is maximizing the social welfare of the same game,
but without v, which is equivalent to considering and infinite cost for v). Then
the payment of node v is the opportunity cost imposed by his presence, i.e.,
prv = cv1(v∈y∗r and y∗r>0)+
∑
w
cw1(w∈(y∗
−v
)r and (y∗
−v
)r>0)−
∑
w
cw1(w∈y∗r and y∗r>0).
(3)
VCG actually drives the ASes to declare their real costs cTv = c¯
T
v for sending
traffic, and therefore yields an allocation that minimizes the total (real) cost of
routing, verifying at the same time incentive compatibility [18, 19].The BGP-
based computational model and distribution of price computation is described.
In Feigenbaum model, that the (cost-based) routing table of each provider is
determined from the transit costs for each neighbor. The source provider uses
the declared cost from intermediate providers to find the optimal path to des-
tination. Whenever there are some changes in network topology, all providers
will update their routing tables. When dealing with auctions, the computa-
tional outcome of the game is often seen as a linear program, or more generally
as an optimization under constraints, and is computationally hard. In [18, 19],
there is no bandwidth capacities or budget constraints for players, leading to a
simpler computation. The complexity in this model comes from the distributed
price computation due to BGP-compatible motivation. Complexity issue will
be discussed more in next section.
Consider an illustration of this mechanism. Figure 1 represents an Inter-
domain topology, in which a source ISP would like to forward its traffic/flow
xIsource to the destination node through several intermediate ASes.
On the Figure, transit costs for the source ISP are expressed for each inter-
mediate node above the node. On this topology, using DFS (Deep First Search)
[65], there are 6 possible paths that can carry the traffic flow yr to destination.
The loop paths and the paths having more than two hops are not considered.
The path minimizing the total (declared) routing cost is Source − C − E −
Destination having total cost 5 (or total valuation −5) for both C and E, see
the Table 1 for more details. To compute the price paid to node C for instance,
remark that if C is excluded from the game, the cost minimizing path becomes
Source− B − E −Destination with total unit cost 7. Therefore, the payment
to C is pC = 2 + (7− 5) = 4. In a similar way, the payment to E is 5 per unit.
RR n° 6992
12 Tran & Tuffin
Figure 1: Simple Inter-domain Topology
Possible path Total cost
Source− A−D −Destination 9
Source− A− E −Destination 8
Source−B − E −Destination 7
Source− B − F −Destination 10
Source− C −E −Destination 5
Source− C − F −Destination 8
Table 1: Possible paths between source and destination provider with their
associated cost (remember that valuation is minus cost)
Node declared cost payment
A 5 0
B 4 0
C 2 4
D 4 0
E 3 5
F 6 0
Table 2: Costs and payments to nodes for the example of Figure 1. Costs
presented here are only those really applied, that is for the allocated route.
Table 2 displays the payments associated to all nodes. The reader can check
the values.
Remark that with our very general model, the strategy choice can take dif-
ferent forms. Instead of working with costs (only) and playing on the declared
cost, we may add to the valuations V Iv a function due to the valuation from
customers, and then play in addition on the amount of traffic the user wishes to
send. Opportunity costs can be computed as well. Many other forms of game
can be imagined, and some will be presented later on.
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4.2 VCG auction applied to other networking problems
As we have emphasized, VCG is a powerful mechanism which gives us a way
to construct a truthful, dominant strategy mechanism. It can maximize total
social welfare and gives the bidders the incentive to bid their true valuations for
their services. As a result, VCG have been widely applied in various distributed
applications which require the agents to interact with each others to achieve a
global goal.
Another work by J. Feigenbaum at al. is applied VCG mechanism on Multi-
cast cost sharing [18]. In their papers, the authors make use of a previous work
of H. Moulin [42] in order to design a distributed algorithm for multi-cast cost
sharing, namely Marginal Cost (MC) Pricing and Shapley Value mechanism
[56]. MC uses VCG payment rules to charge the cost share. In the case of a
symmetric cost function, it charges only marginal cost COv (yr)−C
O
−v(yr−v), to
agent v on selected route r (for flow yr according to our Inter-domain model),
where COv = yr
(∑
v c
T
v 1(v∈yr and yr>0)
)
is the total cost for path r and flow yr,
and CO−v is for the similar cost for the selected path when v is not part of the
network, and charges nothing to agents to which the flow is not allocated. By
sub-modularity of costs, the payments collected from the users fall short of the
actual cost of service. The mechanism cannot be used by a group of agents in
autarcy.
Other works than Inter-domain or multi-cast are the works of S. Eidenbez,
L. Anderegg, W. Wang, and others in incentive-compatible wireless ad hoc and
Internet routing [15, 2, 63, 27].
4.3 Deficiencies of VCG onto Inter-domain problem
Most works on inter-domain pricing have been done using VCG auction [18, 19].
Indeed, VCG is a very powerful mechanism, since it is the only mechanism
[42] which gives us a general way of constructing a dominant-strategy, truthful
(incentive-compatible), individually rational, and maximizing the social welfare
in quasi-linear settings. However, despite of these attractive properties, VCG
also brings out some undesirable characteristics when applied to our context, as
described below. Indeed, we have already seen that no mechanism can verify
the above properties and at the same time budget balance. The deficiencies of
VCG are therefore described now.
1. Probably the most important drawback of VCG is the fact the VCG does
not verify budget balance. This has been well discussed when VCG is
applied to Inter-domain but also to ad hoc networks in [36], and was
already known in general and highlighted among other weaknesses by other
authors [3, 45, 57, 53]. The issue is that the optimization problem (2),
minimizing total routing cost, only deals with intermediate nodes, and not
the traffic sender. If we include the sender in the VCG auction, he would
pay the sum of declared costs only. But total VCG payment is always
more than the sum of declared cost. This can be verified from (3),where
the first term is the declared cost, but the remaining value is refereed as
subsidies, which are always more than zero because total cost of cheapest
path without v is always more than the cheapest path involved by v. Those
subsidies incentive the intermediate nodes, acting selfishly, to truthfully
reveal their transfer costs and making routing efficient [36]. But as a
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result, the balance of the mechanism is always negative, i.e., the money
has to be added from an external actor, for instance a governmental one to
make the scheme work. This situation is very unlikely. Some procedures
have been designed to partially reduce the total value which has to be
injected to the model and will be described in next subsection.
As a numerical illustration, consider again the example of Figure 1. If we
look at the sum of payments Table 2, it is 9, while cheapest path has a
declared valuation of 5. The VCG payment for these intermediate nodes
is even more than the second (declared) cheapest cost 7.
2. Vulnerability to collusion: we noticed that truth telling is a dominant
strategy for each agent, i.e., no one can gain by declaring something else
than his true valuation/cost. However, this is not confirmed in case of
groups of agents. Indeed, it turns out that groups of colluding agents
can achieve a higher utility by coordinating their declarations rather than
honestly reporting their valuations [3, 57]. In a decentralized context
without the presence of a central authority, the group of agents can achieve
higher utility by coordinating their declared cost rather than honestly
bidding its valuations. For example, the cost paid by the source provider
can be increased to 6 for C and 7 for E if the two winners simultaneously
decrease their declared cost by one. As a result, the solution are still
the same for C and E but the total cost charged on source provider is
increased because the loss of declared welfare the auction winners impose
to other provider is increased (because their declared cost is simultaneously
decreased).
3. Computational intractability: in combinatorial auctions (as in our Inter-
domain model where in general we have to deal with auctions on individual
nodes) or in general multi-unit auctions, if the inter-domain deals with
non-elastic demands from intermediate providers, determining the win-
ner is computationally hard [33]. The above model from Feigenbaum et
al. simplifies the issue by not considering any bandwidth or capacity con-
straint. In that case, the only complexity issue comes from the distributed
price computation from hop-to-hop computation for each AS in the net-
work. For BGP to converge (when all Lowest Cost Path (LCPs) found), it
requires d stages of computation where d is the maximum number of AS
hops in an LCP and N is the number of ASes in V . Each stage involves
O(Nd) communication on any links [18]. If Inter-domain resource allo-
cation problems involve more constraints (bandwidth, budget, etc), the
optimization problem can become computationally intractable. The ex-
ample of a comprehensive optimization model for Inter-domain allocation
will be presented lately.
4.4 Improvements for applying VCG to Inter-domain
VCG mechanism has therefore been recently applied in various network ap-
plications. Some authors have applied VCG mechanism in order to achieve
an dominant-strategy, incentive-compatible and efficient allocation algorithm.
Unfortunately, we have already seen thanks to Myerson theorem that such an
algorithm cannot verify budget balance. In this section, we consider several
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algorithms and applications which are variations (mostly) based on VCG and
decompose them into two sub-groups, budget-balanced and budget-imbalanced.
In each sub-group, we investigate the properties of mechanism design in cases
which property they verify or remove when applied to inter-domain resource
allocation problems.
4.4.1 The imbudget-balanced approaches
H. Moulin recently investigated the problem of assigning multiple objects to N
agents using a modification of VCG mechanism [41], and to improve the imbal-
ance of the budget. The main idea is to distribute a suitable rebate function τ
to each participant, in such as way that the sum of the rebate functions almost
exhaust the revenue from the auction. Adapting it to our inter-domain prob-
lem, source nodes would like to form a route r to its wished destination. Let’s
denote by ζ as the number of traffic flows (i.e. couple source-destination) that
have to be carried, if possible, and remember that is yr is the flow on route r.
The problem now becomes assigning an object y∗r to ζ agents. The set of flows
y∗r can be chosen as the solution of the optimization problem:
min
y
∑
v∈N
c−Tv · x
T
v s.t. y
∗
r = x
T
v , ∀v ∈ r
∗
where, again, xTv is total amount of traffic forwarded by node v and c
−T
v its
transfer cost per unit of flow. We therefore again try to minimize the total
routing cost. The total cost for the sender of traffic flow y∗r on route r is
determined as
ρr∗ = vy∗r − v−y∗r + τ−y∗r (4)
where
τ−y∗r =
ζ−1∑
k=2
(−1)k−2
L∗(ζ, 1)
kL∗(ζ, k)
y∗k−r∗ , L
∗(ζ, k) =
(
ζ−1
1
)
ζ−1∑
k=1
(
ζ−1
k
) .
vy∗r is the efficiency surplus with a strategy profile y
∗
r
2 and v−y∗r is the worst
efficiency surplus in the absence of strategy profile y∗r
3 . L∗ is the smallest
efficiency loss4 of the mechanism and y∗k−r∗ is the flow on the kth cheapest path
for a given element of ζ. The main idea is that the total payment is determined
on the route r for y∗r , instead of to each node as in original VCG mechanism or
in J. Feigenbaum et al’s work. The total payment for a subset of node formed
a route r∗ based on Moulin afterward is then distributed to each intermediate
node/seller. The assignment of one object to ζ agents using VCG become a
second sealed bid auction. The advantage of the payment function is that,
by using a rebate function τ from Moulin’s approaches, total cost imposed on
source provider for r∗ is always lesser than the second cheapest path. On the
2Given a profile of valuation x, a vector x∗ is its permutation where coordinates are ar-
ranged decreasingly x∗1 ≥ x∗2 ≥ ...x∗ζ. The efficient surplus given one object and the profile
of valuations y∗r is vy∗r = x
∗1.
3Similarly, v−y∗r = x
∗1
−y∗r
4The worst efficiency loss is the maximum ratio of the mechanism’s budget imbalance to
efficiency surplus over all profiles of non-negative valuations. In our case of assigning one
object, the efficiency loss is L∗(ζ, 1) = max out flow money
efficient surlplus
= maxx∈Rζ
x∗1−x∗1
−y∗r
vy∗r
.
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example defined Figure 1, the total payment received by intermediate nodes in
r∗ is ρr∗ = −5 + τ−y∗r where
τ−y∗r =
13
62
y∗2−r∗ −
8
93
y∗3−r∗ +
3
62
y∗4−r∗ −
1
31
y∗5−r∗ ' −1.1.
The total payment the source provider should pay the intermediate nodes is 6.1
per unit traffic, almost approach the total declared cost from the sellers: the
difference between between payment and rewards is now 1.1 instead of 4 as in the
original VCG of Equation (2). To illustrate more the budget imbalance between
VCG and VCG-Moulin payment rules, we make 100.000 different simulations
on Matlab using the topology described Figure 1, with for each node a transit
cost randomly generated from a uniform distribution over {2, . . . , 10}. The
empirical cumulative distribution of budget imbalance is depicted in Figure 2
for the two algorithms. We can see that VGC generates more monetary loss in
the market than VCG-Moulin’s payment, but on the other hand yields a larger
social welfare as depicted in Figure 3. The Moulin’s mechanism is claimed to
achieve asymptotic efficiency, strategy-proof, preserving IR property (with a
single object) while almost satisfying budget-balanced, but still not verifying it.
It therefore still suffers from this drawback, though at a lesser extent, and at
the expense of a longer computation of costs.
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Figure 2: Empirical cumulative distribution of the budget imbalance in VCG
auction
4.4.2 The budget-balanced approaches
In this subsection, we concentrate on the budget-balanced property. We indeed
believe that it is an important one, if not a requirement, towards self-organized
inter-domain pricing. We are going to describe several approaches. Each time,
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Figure 3: Empirical cumulative distribution of the social welfare in VCG auction
another property (at least) has to be relaxed. Note also that several can be,
but can be almost verified, which can have some interest if the computational
complexity is reduced (for instance).
M. Dramitinos et al. [13] also applied VCG reserve pricing for bandwidth
allocation over links, relaxed efficiency property and using multi-units Dutch
auction for agents to bid the links. Their mechanism can be formulated in our
Inter-domain model as follows. Each intermediate node v ∈ V is characterized
by a pair (xTv , cˆ
T0
v ) where x
T
v is the maximal capacity node v willing to sell for
forwarding external traffic and cˆT0v is the initial price per unit. Then, following
Dutch auctions principle, the price on intermediate nodes is reduced as time
elapses. Source providers place their bids when prices are reasonable to them
and are instantly allocated bandwidth over a bundle of links (to form yr). The
scheme continues until price reaches zero which helps to compute payment since
first price payment is not considered. Providers with higher bids are therefore
allocated first. The game is therefore different from those in previous sections:
we rather have a game where players are traffic senders competing for (lim-
ited) resources, while sellers, intermediate nodes just sell to the highest bidders
(no cost is involved here). Price reduction speed can be different, according
to demand and residual capacity, in order to solve the game faster. Senders
submit their bids when the prices (which are then different for each link) are
such that their utility for the whole path is reached. Efficiency is shown to be
verified, but only under full information about market demand, which is un-
likely. The payment for intermediate nodes is determined as the opportunity
cost it imposed on others and based on their reserve quantities while bidding
for the bandwidth, i.e., the bids of users excluded from the allocation. Also
routes are awarded exactly that amount of money. Overall, the scheme is not
efficient (provided no full knowledge of demand), incentive-compatible thanks
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to the second price principle, budget-balanced because senders pay exactly for
what they have (which is less than their bids), and scalable with respect to the
number and capacities of links and the number of users.
B. Faltings also made some changes in VCG payments by randomly selecting
an excluded coalition of an agent or a group of agents whose bids are rejected
during the optimization [16]. The excluded coalition can be chosen by any
mechanism that does not depend on the utility declarations of the successful
agents, and will pay for the (negative) collected surplus. Their work is fine
when surplus is positive, but, it is unlikely to ask excluded players (getting no
resource) to pay for others and in order to reach budget balance. Consequently,
if applied to Inter-domain, the mechanism is neither efficient nor individually
rational.
The AGV (Arrow, d’Aspremon and Gerarld-Varet) mechanism [12] also pro-
vides some modifications to Vickrey payments. The AGV unit payment is for-
mulated as
prv =
∑
w
c¯w1(w∈(y∗
−v
)r and (y∗
−v
)r>0)−
1
N − 1
∑
w 6=v

∑
u6=w
c¯u1(u∈(y∗
−w
)r and (y∗
−w
)r>0)

 .
(5)
For each node v, it calculates the minimal cost when v is excluded,
∑
w
c¯w1(w∈(y∗
−v
)r and (y∗
−v
)r>0),
and each agent v is charged a 1(N−1) share of the payments made to each of
the other agents. It guarantees that the mechanism is budget-balanced but
two sacrifices are made in exchange for this property. AGV is truthful only
in Bayes-Nash equilibrium rather than dominant strategies and is only ex ante
individually rational. Scalability is still an issue though. Variations of the
redistribution, instead of being uniform among the N − 1 other agents in (5),
can be more subtle [7, 24, 25]. With this type of mechanisms, some agents may
not be the winner (in terms of getting traffic) and still have to pay to make the
system balanced. It seems unlikely in the case of Inter-domain.
5 Alternative solutions
We propose here alternative mechanisms for inter-domain pricing.
5.1 Combinatorial double-sided auctions
Most auctions applied to network allocation problems are one-sided auctions:
either multiple buyers compete for commodities sold by one seller, or multiple
sellers compete for the right to sell to one buyer. Combinatorial double-sided
auctions are auctions in which both sellers and buyers submit their demand
or supply bids. In some applications, combinatorial double-sided auctions are
more efficient than several one-sided auctions combined [69]. Inter-domain is
actually a natural application with multiple sellers (providers could transit traf-
fic by request) and multiple buyers (providers which want to forward traffic to
destination for their customers). Our aim is therefore to apply combinatorial
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double-sided auctions to Inter-domain pricing. R. Jain et al have applied com-
binatorial double-sided auctions to network resource allocation [30, 31]. The
mechanism is claimed to be ex ante individually rational, efficient and strongly
budget-balanced, but truth-telling is dominant strategy for all players except
the highest matched sellers over each traffic flow [31]. Therefore, incentive com-
patibility property is in some sense almost verified. The mechanism is defined
briefly and more formally now. While in [30, 31] buyers and sellers are separate
players, in our case they are both at the same time, which is more complicated
as require an adaptation.
Each provider v places buy-bids on a set of routes Rv (note that routes are
here initiated from v, but this can be extended without difficulty). For each
route r ∈ Rv, the bid is made of the maximum per unit price cˆ
I
v(r) AS v is
willing to pay and the maximum amount yˆr he is willing to get. He additionally
places sell-bids (cˆTv (r), xˆv(r)) for routes r AS v is on, where cˆ
T
v (r) is the minimum
unit price he wants to sell resource and xˆv(r) the maximum amount he agrees
to sell.
The auctioneer then tries to allocate resource on routes, y = (yr)r such that
max
y
∑
v
∑
r∈Rv
cˆIv(r)yr −
∑
v
cˆTv (r)x
T
v (6)
such that
0 ≤ yr ≤ yˆr ∀r
xv(r) ≤ xˆv(r) ∀v
xT = Ay ≤ xˆT
where
A = (Avr)v,r with Avr = 1 of v ∈ r, 0 otherwise
y = (yr)r
xT = (xTv )v.
Following [31], the (settlement) price imposed to a buyer is the highest ask
price among matched sellers. Buyers’ (resp. sellers’) bids are larger (resp.
smaller) than the settlement price. The payment made by buyers is exactly
what sellers get, thus making the mechanism budget-balanced. The mechanism
is shown to be efficient, individually rational, strongly budget-balanced but not
incentive compatible, though almost incentive compatible. The payment rule
applied to our example is illustrated Table 3. The scheme is particularly at-
tractive due to all those properties. On the other hand, solving the allocation
problem is an NP-hard problem, making it complicated to be applied to large
topologies. To make the mechanism decentralized (and scalable), each provider
would better interact with its neighbor ASes (according to its routing table).
Then it becomes a double-sided auction in case of one buyer and its neighbor
sellers. In other words, the above mathematical optimization problem is de-
composed into several local optimization problems (relation between an AS and
its neighbors), and those local problems have to be match such that the whole
allocation for a path is the same on all nodes. In Jain et al’s work, the mecha-
nism needs a central authority for the calculation of the surplus maximization
RR n° 6992
20 Tran & Tuffin
problem (6). So, we would like to apply a distributed constraint optimization
problem using only a partial information between every pair of nodes to find yr.
Another option is to apply VCG double-sided auction to preserve incentive
compatibility property [32]. Quoting [32], if y˜−v (respectively y¯−v) is the allo-
cation vector when yˆr = 0 ∀r ∈ Rv (respectively xˆv(r) = 0 for all route r v is
on) the money transfer (the payment) to be made by buyer v is
C˜v =
∑
u6=v
∑
r∈Ru
cˆIu(r)(y˜
−v
r − yr)−
∑
u
∑
r∈Ru
cˆTu (r)((x˜
T
r )
−v − xTv ) (7)
and the money transfer to be made by seller v (negative would means transfer
to the seller)
C¯v =
∑
u
∑
r∈Ru
cˆIu(r)(y¯
−v
r − yr)−
∑
u6=v
∑
r∈Ru
cˆTu (r)((x¯
T
r )
−v − xTv ). (8)
Payment can alternatively be made by route, by just removing the considered
route, instead of the whole set of route of AS v. This mechanism seems to
give us another approach for inter-domain pricing but it still suffers from some
problems (budget balance being the main one) requiring to be solved in order
to be applied to inter-domain.
David Parkes et al. [48] have modified Vickrey payment in order to achieve
an fairly efficient, fairly incentive-compatible in VCG combinatorial double-
sideds auction scheme while remaining BB and IR properties. Budget balance
is achieved in bilateral trading by redistributing the surplus to all agents involved
in the trade. Payment to each node v could be transformed from opportunity
cost in (7-8) to Vickrey discount [48] by
prv = cˆ
T
v (r)1(v∈y∗r and y∗r>0) −∆V CG, (9)
prv = cˆ
I
v(r) −∆V CG, ∀r ∈ Rv (10)
where ∆V CG is the Vickrey double-sided auction discount and ∆
∗
V CG is modified
Vickrey discount defined in [48] to get mechanism’s budget balance. Vickrey
discount is the marginal utility in which the agent v contributes to the mar-
ket. Vickrey discount is always non-negative, representing smaller payments by
buyers and higher payments to sellers and is calculated by
∆V CG = V
∗ − V ∗−v
∆∗V CG = max(0,∆V CG −
(
∑
v∈r∗ ∆V CG − V
∗)
|r∗|
(11)
where
V ∗ =
∑
v∈y∗
∑
r
(cˆIv(r) · yr − cˆ
T
v (r) · x
T
v )
is the total gain from trade under optimal allocation of goods.
V ∗−v =
∑
u∈y∗
(−v)
∑
r
(cˆIu(r) · y˜
−v
r − c
T
u (r) · (x˜
T
r )
−v)
is the sum of all gain from trade under optimal allocation of goods without
agent v. So budget balance holds when
∑
∀r
∆V CG(yr) ≤ V
∗. The authors have
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provided multiple modified Vickrey discounts ∆∗V CG and have compared their
results in experiment. The mechanism is interesting for us because it brings out
the fairly good performance in terms of social welfare (≈ 90% of the optimal one)
with low difference between real and declared costs in providing their services
according to simulations (i.e., the model is fairly incentive compatible). Table 3
illustrates the different payments in combinatorial double-sided auctions applied
to our example defined Figure 1. We assume that the buyer/ source provider
specifies its willingness to pay cIyr = 7 cost per unit traffic for the whole path to
destination5. In Table 3, we notice that the difference between declared valua-
Node Valuation (∆V CG,∆
∗
V CG
) VCG[32] Modified VCG[48] Highest price[32]
Src 7 (2, 1
3
) 5 7− 1
3
5
A −5 (0, 0) 0 0 0
B −4 (0, 0) 0 0 0
C −2 (2, 1
3
) -4 −(2 + 1
3
) −2
D −4 (0, 0) 0 0 0
E −3 (3, 4
3
) -6 −(3 + 4
3
) −3
F −6 (0, 0) 0 0 0
Table 3: Costs and payments to nodes for the example of Figure 1.
tion and rewards in VCG double-sided auction is −5, negative payment means
the agent receiving the money from the trade. In that case, the mechanism
has to inject money to make it work. On contrary, if we apply modified VCG
double-sided auction by D. Parkes, the surplus has been redistributed only to
agents involved in the trade to make it budget-balanced. The highest ask-price
rules by R. Jain in combinatorial auction also lead to the budget-balanced pay-
ments. We also run simulations for double-sided auctions using Matlab on the
topology described in Figure 1, with again node transit costs uniformly and
independently distributed over {2, . . . , 10}. Notice first that double-sided VCG
auction generates the same values of budget imbalance than in the single-sided
case, whatever the bidding values of the buyers. Furthermore, although mod-
ified VCG payment rules by D. Parkes et al. induce different payments than
with the highest matched price proposed R. Jain et al., both pricing schemes
generate exactly the same social welfare. An empirical cumulative distribution
of the social welfare for VCG and the VCG mechanism modifield by D. Parkes
et al. is depicted in Figure 4 for the different payment rules in double-sided
auction.
The difference between the pricing rules in Jain’s works defined in [31, 32]
is an illustration of the trade-off in mechanism design following the Myerson
impossibility theory. In [31], the resulting allocation is efficient, ex ante indi-
vidual rational, budget-balanced but not incentive-compatible to the highest
asked sellers. So, it could possibly lead to a price war between sellers if they
both try decrease their prices to win the game rather than truth-telling to their
services. Furthermore, the pricing scheme proposed by David Parkes et al. [48]
achieves budget balance in the market but the pricing scheme is only fairly ef-
ficient, fairly incentive-compatible in VCG combinatorial double-sided auction
while remaining BB and IR properties. On the other hand, while using VCG
double-sided auction in [32] the resulting allocation is efficient, individual ratio-
5The price is approximated from the average path cost per unit traffic from all sellers
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Figure 4: Empirical cumulative distribution of social welfare with double-sided
auctions for 50 independent experiments
nal, incentive-compatible to all agents but the scheme does not hold the budget
balance property anymore.
5.2 Incentive and learning mechanisms in distributed com-
puting
In this section, we present some incentive mechanisms6 that provide incentive for
collaboration in distributed systems such as inter-domain, ad hoc and wireless
networks, etc. When the nodes do cooperate, they make communication in
distributed systems viable. It could be the operation of ad hoc network, in
which the infrastructure needs the cooperation of wireless nodes to forward
traffic to destination. Inter-domain is similar since neighboring nodes should
control how traffic enters or leave the network based on inter-domain traffic
volumes, and routes. Pricing mechanism have been applied in rate control in
wired network and resource control in wireless network to provide a means
to stimulate cooperation within the network [9, 14, 21, 35, 37]. To simplify
those approaches, we present a very general incentive algorithm based on pricing
mechanisms.
In our general algorithm, we can see that the strategies and pricing update
functions used is the main ideas and the difference of these approaches. Those
strategies are designed to create the proper incentives for cooperation. The
difference comes from the pricing models/ game strategies applied to the Inter-
6Incentive in cooperation protocols has a different meaning from incentive-compatible prop-
erty in mechanism design. It means providing incentive for selfish nodes to follow exactly
protocols by (usually) giving rewards to them. Incentive-compatible in mechanism design is
the property to describe how the agents truthfully revealed their services in cooperation.
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Algorithm 1 A general incentive algorithm based on pricing
1: Pricing initialization at each node;
2: repeat
3: Nodes: Update(strategies);
4: Nodes: Update(price);
5: until Nash equilibrium
net. Let us begin with recent incentive mechanisms in which we focus on their
strategies and pricing function and try to adapt those to inter-domain.
Relay selection and resource control in wireless networks is quite similar to
the cooperativity problem of buyer/seller in inter-domain pricing. B. Wang et al.
has applied Stackelberg game [47] to stimulate cooperation between relay nodes.
The Stackleberg leadership model [68] is a strategic game in economics in which,
the leader (the source-buyer provider) moves first and then the follower (the
intermediate-seller providers) move after. The motivation of the authors is to
help the source/buyer to smartly choose relay/seller nodes and competing relay
nodes to ask a reasonable price to maximize their utilities. A Stackelberg game is
solved by backward induction in order to find sub-game perfect Nash equilibria.
The buyer/ leader picks a quantity that maximizes its payoff, anticipating the
predicted response of the sellers/ followers. The followers actually observe this
and in equilibrium pick the expected quantity as a response. To place it into
our context, the optimization problem for the source provider/buyer source can
be formulated as:
maxUsource = c
I
source ·
∑
v
xTv −
∑
v
cTv · x
T
v
while as a seller the goal is
maxUseller = c
T
v · x
T
v (12)
where cTv and c
I
source are the declared costs. For the pricing update function
used, the seller nodes first propose a low asking pricing at the beginning and
then, increase the price according to optimal bandwidth purchase from the
source. In this kind of Stackelberg competition model, buyers and sellers are
considered different players. The resulting incentives (by giving rewards and
maximizing player’s utility function) yields an efficient, individually rational,
budget-balanced scheme because the sellers are paid exactly what they pro-
vide for their services. On the other hand, the mechanism is not incentive-
compatible.
A similar step-by-step approach has been applied to inter-domain by D.
Barth et al. [4, 5]. First, they propose a transit price negotiation model for
each provider, then a learning algorithm is used by each provider to update
node’s strategies. The transit price negotiation of nodes depends on the traffic
flow entering and leaving ASes, xIv =
∑
r∈RS(v)
yr and x
T
v =
∑
r∈R\(RS(v)∪RD(v))
yr.
If the operator has no transit traffic, it reduces its price to try to attract some.
If the operator overuses its capacity regardless from serving transit traffic, in
this case it does not update its price. The pricing strategies are based on the
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two parameters (µ, λ) where µ is a ratio between 0 and 1 and λ is an integer.
Moreover, a distributed learning algorithm [54] is applied and analyzed as a
repeated game where providers update their strategies at each stage in order to
learn their optimal prices. Each node’s strategy profile is defined as a probability
vector xtv = (xv,0, .., xv,N ) ∈ X
t
v , where x
t
v,j is the probability node v choose the
price ctv,j ∈ C
t
v (discrete set) at stage t. Similarly to [54, 5, 60], the algorithm is
driven by the following steps:
1. at step 0, an initial strategy profile xtv,0 is chosen. One can for instance a
uniform distribution of no information is available.
2. At each step k, the transit price ctv,k by node v is chosen according to
probability xtv,k.
3. paths with smallest costs are computed based on prices announced by
neighbors and own declared costs.
4. The outcome of the game is computed.
5. Each node computes its utility function uv,k resulting from the outcome
of the game at step k.
6. Each node updates its strategy profile strategy according to
xk+1v,j =


xkv,j − buv,kx
k
v,j if c
t
v,j 6= c
t
v,k
xkv,j + buv,k
∑
∀l,ct
v,l
6=ct
v,k
xkv,l otherwise. (13)
This step adjusts the probability distribution for the transit price, consid-
ering the utility brought from currently adopted strategy. If the utility is
high then the probability of the current strategy is increased, otherwise it
is decreased.
7. If the algorithm has not converged to an equilibrium point, go to step 2.,
otherwise stop.
In the algorithm, b ∈ [0, 1] is the step-size of the updating rule and uv,k is
the normalized utility uv,k =
Uv,k−Av,t
Bv,t−Av,t
, with Av,t = mink≤t Uv,k and Bv,t =
maxv,t Uv,k. ¿From Theorem 3.2 in [54] and Theorem 2 in [70], the algorithm
always converges to a point which is a Nash equilibrium of the game. This game
model does verify very few of the important properties. It is not necessarily
incentive-compatible, nor efficient. But on the other hand, it is budget-balanced,
individually rational, computationally tractable, distributed, which are very
relevant characteristics for inter-domain.
J. Crowcroft et al. [10, 11] also explore the selfish problem in ad hoc networks
using pricing a mechanism in which relay nodes are rewarded for their power
consumption and traffic transfers. Each source node s may choose an amount to
pay per unit time, ωs denoted as its willingness-to-pay parameter, and receives
in return a traffic flow yr, on route r, proportional to ωs. The price rate, as a
function of time, node v charges for forwarding a unit traffic flow along route r
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is denoted by cTv (t). Then, the total flow rate generated by source s is given by
expression ∑
r∈RS
yr(t) =
ωs(t)
minr∈RS
∑
v∈r c
T
v (t)
. (14)
This model selects the lowest cost path as usually in communication net-
works. Pricing strategies are dynamically updated according to each transit
traffic flow yr and maximum supply Xv from intermediate/ relay nodes.
d
dt
cTv (t) =
κcTv (t)
Xv
(xTv (t)−Xv). (15)
The dependence of the right-hand side of (15) on price per unit of traffic and
bandwidth capacity is an attempt to scale the dynamics of the prices in a
network with different prices and capacities. Incentives for collaboration are
achieved by using credit balance. Credit balance is a virtual money and is pro-
vided to each node when they first joint to the network. Each node gains credits
by forwarding traffic for other nodes and using it for payments to other nodes to
ensure end-to-end delivery of its won traffic. By doing so, incentives to forward
are provided. Each node s controls its credit balance, bs(t) by dynamically
adjusting its willingness-to-pay parameter according to the level of its credit
balance by using a formula: ws(t) = αsbs(t) for some parameter αs > 0 [10, 11].
In conclusion, the authors claim that incentives to cooperate are the natural
outcome of the game that emerges from the pricing mechanism. The mech-
anism is not incentive-compatible, but efficient (in term of optimal resources
consumed at transit nodes and routes selected, decentralized, budget-balanced
and individual rational. Global stability of the price and credit balance of the
system can be established if the networks structure is static and have been
verified through simulation.
A related work on optimization of Inter-domain traffic with multiple ISPs
has been conducted by Shakkotai and Srikant [55]. Rather than providing a new
pricing model, the authors examine the existence of equilibrium price strategies
in an Internet model in which Internet is separated by local and transit ISPs.
These ISPs are co-located in a small geographical region and compete for the
same customers and transit ISPs are responsible to transfer traffic between lo-
cal ISPs. Interactions between ISPs are investigated by using repeated games.
Pricing strategies between local ISPs are examined by using Bertrand competi-
tion which is a model of price competition between duopoly firms which results
in each charging the price that would be charged under perfect competition [64].
Interactions between local and transit ISPs are investigated by using Stackelberg
competition in which each ISP plays knowing that the next ISP would optimize
his play based what he does currently [68]. ISPs play in a predefining sequence
to study how they act as price transfer agents between economic levels.
A close but different setting is the optimization of multiple traffic flows
between a pair of providers is investigated by G. Shrimali2007 [58]. In this
game model, two providers with respective utilities Ui and Uj use an iterative
procedure to optimize traffic distribution among different direct paths between
them, instead of multi-hop routes involving independent ISPs (in our model,
if there are several routes among two nodes, those routes are merged). ISPs
utility functions measure some performance indices such as average delay or
maximum load on a link. Using the axiomatic theory of cooperative games,
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a fair and Pareto efficient outcome usually refereed as Nash solution can be
obtained by maximizing the Nash product given by UiUj . The authors then
show that global optimization in can be separated and solved into separable
optimization problem using shadow prices [67] and Lagrangian multipliers [66].
Under this approach, ISPs myopically optimize local objectives while iteratively
playing best response to each other. The scheme is efficient, fair7 but relaxes
the IC property because Nash bargaining is not incentive compatible.
6 Discussion and conclusions
6.1 Summary
The goal of this paper was to describe inter-domain relationships between in-
dependent and selfish providers, and review the pricing mechanisms that have
been proposed to enforce cooperation. The (original) orientation of our paper is
to look at the properties verified by mechanisms. The relevant properties when
dealing with inter-domain are
1. Individual rationality
2. incentive compatibility
3. efficiency
4. decentralization
5. budget balance
6. robustness to collusion.
In the literature, most works were looking at the promising VCG auctions be-
cause it verifies three properties: incentive-compatible, individually rational and
efficient. On the other hand, we have shown that in that case, it is impossible
to verify at the same time budget balance: someone needs o inject money in the
system permanently. The question we wanted therefore to answer was: what are
other mechanisms, and their associated properties? We have reviewed the most
relevant mechanisms. Some of them were applied to other kinds of problems,
and we have adapted to our inter-domain context, described at the beginning
in a general form. We have also remarked that if some properties are not fully
verified, there exist some “almost” versions for which the property is close to
be verified. We have looked at some schemes in this way.
6.2 Discussion about most relevant schemes and research
trends
Now that the basic results have been described, we can discuss the most rele-
vant schemes and properties that should be verified, and the next steps to be
investigated towards better self-managed inter-domain relationships.
7fair means that cooperation should reach equitable performance gains to all agents when
compared to their default strategies
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6.2.1 Discussion on properties
First, we would like to stress that budget-balance is a requirement. Indeed,
it seems important to us that the system can live in autarchy. Even if some
improvement of VCG have been proposed, with almost budget balance, this
will probably not be acceptable from regulators. This circumvents from using
directly VCG and some of its variations (but some could be applied).
Individual rationality is better to be verified too, ensuring that participating
to the game brings non-negative utility. On the other hand, of the expected
value of the utility is necessarily positive (depending on the random unknowns
on the system), this could be sufficient.
Incentive compatibility makes sure that players do not cheat when declaring
resources, costs or prices. This is expected, but could somehow be relaxed; an
“almost version” would be acceptable.
Efficiency ensures that the outcome is the best for the whole system. This is
again something expected for the whole system, and important property. Here
again, an “almost” version, close to the optimal one, would be acceptable, if the
gain in terms of other properties is large.
Decentralization, or scalability, is an important issue. Indeed, the relevant
situation looks at thousands of ISPs if considering a network such as the Internet.
Computing quickly the outcome of the game is an importance factor. This is
also one of the main properties. Even if quantifying the maximum amount of
computations is difficult, an NP-hard procedure cannot be considered.
Collusion of nodes has been widely investigated in distributed environment
such as grid computing, P2P, wireless and ad hoc networks[34, 59]. Such coali-
tions can improve the social welfare of the collude nodes, but they can also harm
the welfare of nodes outside the coalition [26]. When dealing with telecommuni-
cation networks pricing, robustness to collusion is better being verified, although
it is often difficult to check in practice. Even VCG could lead to an efficient
outcome, a group of collude nodes could increase their utilities while decreasing
others. Thus, designing a mechanism which is resilient to collusion could be an
interesting property [62, 38], if the resulting allocation is fairer. Otherwise, why
not being satisfied with collusion if it can lead (or help to lead) to an efficient
outcome?
6.2.2 What about previously described schemes?
Among the previously described schemes, none is totally satisfactory, since an
interesting feature comes at the expense of loosing on another property. Though,
the most relevant mechanisms, in their current form, are probably (in each case
budget balance is verified):
 The double-sided auction of Jain et al. in [31] is efficient, individually ra-
tional, budget-balanced but sacrifices incentive-compatible property when
highest-ask price rule is used. In order to have IC property, VCG double-
sided auction can applied [32], but at the expense of budget balance.
Highest-ask pricing rule is preferred in inter-domain due to the (we be-
lieve) more important budget balance property.Those double-sided auc-
tions can though be only applied to topologies of small to moderate size,
due to the required amount of computations. They are therefore advised
in that case.
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 In a different direction, the work of Barth et al. is easy to implement,
computational feasible. As a trade-off, many properties are not verified,
but tractability is, which is important for large network topologies.
6.2.3 Hints on future research activities
In order to drive to a better scheme, here are the research directions we aim at
pursuing:
 Investigate distributed versions of the most important above schemes
(double-sided auctions...). This might mean loosing in terms of efficiency,
but if the loss is limited, this would be valuable. Most auction mechanisms
listed in our are solved in a centralized way. A research direction would be
to look at algorithms to design a decentralized inter-domain pricing, with
maybe the help of schemes such as DPOP [50] and ADOPT [39]. These
algorithms can deal with the allocation problem as long as the influence
of each agent on the solution is limited to a number of variables. For
instance, following the same principle, Parkes et al. have proposed some
principles for the distributed, faithful implementation of VCG mechanism
[49, 51]. It is also robust to collusion because the algorithm reveals limited
information to the mechanism. Thus the collusion of manipulative players
could be prevented. Dealing with the case where nodes only have contacts
with neighbors is worth being investigated.
 The double-sided auctions should be better studied for our situation where
providers are sellers and buyers at the same time, especially when ASes
have relations with their neighbors only and need to buy bandwidth for
transferring the traffic previous node on a route.
 In order to have budget balance, other important properties have to be re-
laxed. If efficiency is relaxed, we need to analyze in the detail the efficiency
loss (in term of social welfare).
 The economic views of ISPs in Internet have been investigated by Shakko-
tai et al. using repeated games in several competition models. But only
flat-based pricing is used to analyze in the model, so making use of other
pricing mechanisms could lead to new results.
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